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Abstract: 
This article examines Carl Menger’s thought on labour from broad points of view. 
Founded on his subjectivist perspective, Menger insisted on the predominance of 
goods of lower order over goods of higher order in value determination. He argued that 
wages, too, are determined according to this rule, like rent and capital interest. He denied 
the peculiarities of labour services and, therefore, of labour exchange. As a consequence, 
despite his reference to the direct impact of labour on the worker’s welfare, Menger 
neglected it and restricted the object of his economic study on the worker’s behaviour to 
labour supply in the market place. Thus, actual labour and the worker’s motivation behind 
it were excluded from the object. 
Menger refused to be labelled an adherent of laissez-faireism and approved modest 
state interventions in the protection of workers. He simultanesouly preached class 
harmony by placing emphasis on the indispensability of capital accumulation and 
entrepreneurship to the benefit of workers.
For all his advocacy of subjectivism and respect for actuality, Menger lacked his 
consideration of the worker’s identity as to her/his labour performance. This identity 
makes the nature of labour exchange differ from that of the exchange of non-human 
services. By the comparison of Menger, Jevons, and Walras, this article also explains that, 
despite their disparities, the triumvirate of the Marginalist Revolution shared the 
limitation, which was to characterise the neoclassical theory of labour. 
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The objective of this article is to elucidate the characteristics of Carl Menger’s 
thought on labour by examining it from broad points of view, and further, by 
comparing the thinking of the trio of the Marginalist Revolution, Menger, William 
Stanley Jevons, and Léon Walras, to illuminate their commonality that provided a 
pivotal foundation for the neoclassical theory of labour, as well as their differences.
Carl Menger (1840–1921) has maintained a solid reputation as being one of the 
triumvirate of the Marginalist Revolution and as the founder of the Austrian School. 
A large number of studies, therefore, have been undertaken on his economics. 
However, very few of them have elaborated on his views of labour issues.（１）   This 
may, to a considerable extent, be ascribed to the relative paucity of Menger’s own 
comments on the issues in his writings. Nevertheless, lack of a full enquiry into his 
discussions on such an important subject as labour could be a serious impediment to 
the progress of Menger studies. Indeed, Menger’s references to labour exhibit some 
fundamental features of his economics.
Thus, this article deals with Menger’s thought on labour from various angles. 
What characterises the thought most typically is the negation of the distinctiveness 
of labour services and the resulting identification of the nature of labour exchange 
with that of the exchange of non-human services. Hence, Menger argued that wages 
are determined on the same principles as rent and capital interest. Here, based on his 
subjectivist approach and criticism of classical notions, he emphasised the value 
causality running from products to productive services as a general rule. 
Furthermore, although Menger touched on the direct impact of labour on the 
worker’s welfare, he neglected it. Consequently, he restricted the object of his 
（₁ ）　Ugo Pagano (1985, 81–84), Erich W. Streissler (1990b), and Yukihiro Ikeda (2010) are 
among the remarkable studies done on Menger’s thought on labour. 
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economic study on the worker’s behaviour to labour supply in the market place and 
excluded actual labour and the worker’s motivation behind it from the object. Also, 
Menger denied the capital–labour and employer–worker conflict of interest by 
underlining the necessity for capital accumulation and entrepreneurship for the well-
being of the working class.
Most importantly, Menger, for all his advocacy of subjectivism and respect for 
actuality, was lacking in his consideration of the worker’s identity, especially as to 
her/his preference regarding the type and intensity of labour qua an inalienable 
possessor of labour ability, which makes labour exchange dissimilar from the 
exchange of non-human services. This article will further illustrate that Menger, 
Jevons, and Walras had the deficiency in common. This limitation was to take root 
in neoclassical economics, typified by the subsumption of labour exchange under its 
general market doctrine in the formative process of marginal productivity theory. 
Section II outlines basic features of Menger’s economic theory. Section III 
explains Menger’s conceptions of labour characterised by his denial of the 
peculiarities of labour services and wage determination, and the minimisation of the 
labour process. Section IV treats Menger’s opinions on labour policy. While 
approving modest state interventions in the protection of workers from the abuses by 
the rich, Menger championed the capitalist order and preached class harmony by 
stressing the role of capital accumulation and entrepreneurship and the dependence 
of worker interests on them. Section V compares the thought of Menger, Walras, and 
Jevons on labour, thereby explicating their commonality that evolved to mark the 
neoclassical theory of labour as well as their differences. Section VI concludes the 
article.
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II　Menger’s Economic Theory: Basic Features
Menger formed an economic theory accentuating the supremacy of consumer 
demand and the roundaboutness of production, which developed into a perspective 
characterising the Austrian School. However, his views differed from those of his 
successors in some important respects.
Menger defines goods (Güter) in the first edition of Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtchaftslehre (hereafter GV1) of 1871. He states:
We refer to those things which have the qualification to be put just in a causal 
connection with the satisfaction of human needs as useful things. In so far as we 
recognise this causal connection and, furthermore, we are in a position to have 
actual recourse to the things in question for the satisfaction of our needs, we refer 
to them as goods (Diejenigen Dinge, welche die Tauglichkeit haben, in Causal-
Zusammenhang mit der Befriedung menschlicher Bedürfnisse geradezu zu 
werden, nennen wir Nützlichkeiten, wofern wir diesen Causal-Zusammenhang 
aber erkennen und es zugleich in unserer Macht haben, die in Rede stehenden 
Dinge zur Befriedung unserer Bedürfnisse thatsächlich heranzuziehen, nennen 
wir sie Güter). (Menger [1871] 1968, 1–2) 
A similar definition is also provided in the second edition of Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtchaftslehre (hereafter GV2), published in 1923, after Menger’s death (see 
Menger 1923, 10). 
Menger adds that ‘I believe ... that all goods can be classified into the two 
categories of material goods (including all forces of power as far as they are goods) 
and useful human actions (or inactions), the most important of which are labour 
performances’ (Ich glaube ... dass die Gesammtheit der Güter sich in die beiden 
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Kategorien der Sachgüter (einschliesslich aller Natürkräfte, so weit sie Güter sind) 
und in nützliche menschliche Handlungen (beziehungsweise Unterlassungen), deren 
wichtigste die Arbeitsleistungen sind, einordnen lassen) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 7).
Also, Menger classifies goods into goods of first order and goods of higher 
order. This assortment may roughly correspond to the ordinary classification into 
final (consumption) goods and means of production. Menger further subdivides 
goods of higher order into ‘goods of second order’, ‘goods of third order’, ‘goods of 
fourth order’, and so forth, according to the stage remoteness of their use from the 
completion of final goods, under the implicit assumption of the likes of the linear 
structure of production (see Menger [1871] 1968, 7–11; 1923, 20–23).
While making numerous laudatory remarks on Menger’s theory, George J. 
Stigler argues that ‘One general weakness in Menger’s exposition which clouds his 
value theory is the failure … to differentiate between durable goods of any order and 
their services’ (see Stigler [1941] 1968, 154). A main cause for such criticism may 
be that, unlike the common practice, Menger includes services themselves with 
goods. As an illustration, Menger states in GV2: ‘Not merely technical means of 
production, let alone material ones, but also generally all (material and immaterial) 
goods through which we (on the way of production and exchange) command goods 
of lower order—capital uses, labour performances, etc., too—are to be regarded as 
goods of higher order’ (Als Güter höherer Ordnung sind nicht etwa lediglich die 
technischen oder wohl gar nur die materiellen Produktionsmittel zu betrachten, 
sondern überhaupt alle (materiellen und immateriellen) Güter, durch welche wir (auf 
dem Wege von Produktion und Verkehr) über Güter niedrigerer Ordnung verfügen 
(auch Kapitalnutzungen, Arbeitsleistungen usf.) ) (see Menger [1923] 23). 
Meanwhile, he writes in GV2:
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Of major importance for economic theory and particularly of fundamental 
significance for capital- and income doctrine is the distinction between sources of 
use and their time-limited use; for example, the distinction between house 
buildings, pieces of land, household goods, etc., on the one hand, and their time-
limited use, on the other hand (Von großer Wichtigkeit für die Wirtschaftstheorie, 
inbesondere aber von grundlegender Bedeutung für die Kapitals- und 
Einkommenslehre ist die Unterscheidung der Nutzungsquelle und ihrer zeitlich 
begrenzten Nutzung, z. B. der Wohngebäude, Grundstücke, Hausgeräte usf. 
einerseits und der zeitlich begrenzten Nutzung derselben andererseits). (Menger 
[1923] 19)
Menger also remarks that ‘The value of a use good is equal to the total value of its 
uses’ (Der Wert eines Nutzungsgutes ist gleich dem Werte der Totalität seiner 
Nutzungen) (see Menger 1923, 159).（２）   These passages demonstrate that Menger 
reached a clear perception of factor-service demarcation with regard to ‘material 
goods’.（３）
As quoted above, Menger includes ‘the most important useful human actions’, 
that is, labour performances (Arbeitsleistungen) among goods. He also notes in GV2 
that ‘it is a matter of rule that in civilised nations only a man’s performances which 
are provided voluntarily or upon an agreement, and not the man himself, can become 
means of the satisfaction of needs of other people and, therefore, goods’ 
(Regelmäßig können in zivilisierten Staaten nur freiwillig, respektive auf Grund 
eines Übereinkommens dargebotene Leistungen eines Menschen und nicht dieser 
（₂ ）　Menger terms what are equivalent to durable goods ‘Nutzungsgüter’, in distinction to 
‘Verbrauchsgüter’, which are equivalent to consumable goods (see Menger 1923, 19).
（₃ ）　It is hard to find specific references to the factor-service relation in GV1. The above 
judgement by Stigler might be made chiefly on the basis of GV1.
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selbst Mittel für die Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse anderer Personen und somit Güter 
werden) (see Menger 1923, 12). Moreover, in the manuscript of Menger’s lectures to 
Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria in January, 1876, which was put on record by the 
prince (hereafter LJ76), it is written that ‘One interprets basic assets to be the lasting 
foundation of any income; in this case, labour power of a man will be regarded as 
basic assets; in the popular sense, contrariwise, one interprets basic assets to be only 
those transferable objects of assets which bring about lasting income independent of 
their owner’s labour’ (Unter Vermögensstamm versteht man die dauernde Grundlage 
eines jeden Einkommens; in diesem Falle wird auch die Arbeitskraft eines Menschen 
als Vermögensstamm zu betrachten sein; im populären Sinne dagegen versteht man 
unter Vermögensstamm nur jene übertragbaren Vermögensobjekte, welche ein von 
der Arbeit des Besitzers unabhängiges dauerndes Einkommen liefern) (see E. W. 
Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 62). These words suggest that, although not as 
explicitly as Walras, Menger also distinguished between labour ability as a factor 
and its service, which correspond to labour power (Arbeitskraft) and labour (Arbeit) 
in Karl Marx’s phraseology, and understood the inalienability of labour ability from 
its possessor (see Walras 1988, 264–265; Okada 2011, 48–49).
In Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften, und der 
Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere (hereafter UMS) of 1883, Menger singles out 
‘needs (Bedürfnisse)’ and ‘goods that are directly offered to men by nature (means 
of production as well as of consumption concerned) (die den Menschen unmittelbar 
von der Natur dargebotenen Güter (sowohl die bezüglichen Genuss- als 
Produktionsmittel))’, and ‘the desire for the most complete satisfaction of needs 
possible (for the most complete filling of the requirement for goods possible) (das 
Streben nach möglichst vollständiger Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse (nach möglichst 
vollständiger Deckung des Güterbedarfes))’ as the most original factors of human 
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economy. Menger argues that these factors are ultimately independent of human 
arbitrariness (Willkür) and given by each situation. He justifies the study to explain 
the laws for the evolution of more complicated economic phenomena from the 
simple factors by referring to it as ‘the exact direction of theoretical research (die 
exacte Richtung der theoretischen Forschung)’, in contrast to ‘the realistic-empirical 
direction (die realistisch-empirische Richtung)’ taken by German historical 
economists (see Menger [1883] 1969, 45, 49–59).
The theoretical unfolding in Grundsätze der Volkswirtchaftslehre may be 
regarded as Menger’s own attempts at the exact direction. One of its most striking 
hallmarks is the underlying concept that ‘needs’ and ‘the desire for the most 
complete satisfaction of needs possible’ of the consumer have supremacy, and goods 
and their production are subject to them. As a ramification for this, the status of 
goods of higher order is held to depend on that of goods of lower order. In GV2, 
Menger clearly states:
[I]n the quality of goods, goods (without distinction of order) are generally 
conditioned by the existence of needs whose satisfaction they serve, or, with 
respect to the quality of goods, goods of higher order are conditioned 
by that of goods of lower order whose production they serve. The 
quality of goods of lower order is the cause, not the effect, of that of goods of 
higher order (means of production that serve their production) ([D]ie Güter 
überhaupt (ohne Unterschied ihrer Ordnung) in ihrer Güterqualität durch das 
Vorhandensein der Bedürfnisse bedingt sind, zu deren Befriedigung sie dienen, 
beziehungsweise daß die Güter höherer Ordnung in Rücksicht auf ihre 
Güterqualität durch jene der Güter niederer Ordnung bedingt sind, 
zu deren Hervorbringung sie dienen. Die Güterqualität der Güter niederer 
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Ordnung ist die Ursache, nicht die Wirkung derjenigen der Güter höherer 
Ordnung (der Produktionsmittel, die zu ihrer Hervorbringung dienen)). (Emphasis 
in original; Menger 1923, 27)
A similar argument is also set forth in GV1 (see Menger [1871] 1968, 17–21). 
Hence, if a good of first order loses its quality of being good due to the loss of needs 
for it, all relevant goods of higher order also lose their quality of goods in Menger’s 
view.
The same holds for the relationship between the value of goods of first order 
and that of goods of higher order. Menger defines: ‘Value … is the significance that 
concrete goods or quantities of goods acquire for us because we are conscious that 
we are dependent on the command of them in the satisfaction of our needs’ ([E]s ist 
… der Werth die Bedeutung, welche concrete Güter oder Güterquantitäten für uns 
dadurch erlangen, dass wir in der Befriedung unserer Bedürfnisse von der Verfügung 
über dieselben abhängig zu sein uns bewusst sind) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 78; see 
also Menger 1923, 103). He also argues: ‘Value is … of subjective nature not only 
on its essence but also on its measure. Goods always have “value” for certain 
economic agents and have certain value only for such agents’ (Der Werth ist … nicht 
nur seinem Wesen, sondern auch seinem Masse nach subjectiver Natur. Die Güter 
haben „Werth“ stets für bestimmte wirtschaftende Subjekte, aber auch für solche 
einen bestimmten Werth) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 119). Thus, Menger takes a 
thoroughly subjectivist position on value and rejects the labour and production cost 
theories of value (see, for example, Menger [1871] 1968, 120–121; 1923, 144–146).
Such a passage as that below in GV1 suggests that Menger, de facto, holds that 
the value of goods of first order or consumption goods equals their marginal utility:
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In every specific case ... only those of satisfactions of needs secured 
by the whole quantity of the goods set available to an economic 
person which have the least significance to this person are dependent 
on the command of a certain partial quantity thereof. Accordingly, 
the value of a partial quantity of the available goods set for that 
person is equal to the significance that the least important of the 
satisfactions of needs secured by the whole quantity and brought 
about with a same partial quantity have for him (Es sind … in jedem 
c o n c r e t e n  F a l l e  v o n  d e r  V e r f ü g u n g  ü b e r  e i n e  b e s t i m m t e 
Thei lquant i tät  der  e iner  wirtschaftenden Person verfügbaren 
Gütermenge  nur  jene  der  durch  d ie  Gesammtquant i tä t  noch 
gesicherten Bedürfnissbefriedigungen abhängig, welche für diese 
Person die geringste Bedeutung unter diesen letztern haben und der 
Werth einer Theilquantität der verfügbaren Gütermenge ist für jene 
Person demnach gleich der Bedeutung, welche die am wenigsten 
wichtige der durch die Gesammtquantität noch gesicherten und mit 
e i n e r  g l e i c h e n  T h e i l q u a n t i t ä t  h e r b e i z u f ü h r e n d e n 
Bedürfnissbefriedigungen für sie haben). (Emphasis in original; Menger 
[1871] 1968, 98–99)（₄）
Furthermore, in GV1 Menger effectively brings forth what are called Gossen’s first 
and second laws, that is, the principle of diminishing marginal utility and that of 
equimarginal utility (see Menger [1871] 1968, 92–93, 98). Thus, as has been 
generally accepted, Menger may be ranked among the earliest proponents of 
（₄ ）　Menger also makes a similar explanation in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 127).
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marginal utility theory, alongside Hermann Heinrich Gossen, Jevons, and Walras.
What, then, about the value of goods of higher order or means of production? 
The following statements express Menger’s basic stand on the issue:
[A]ll value phenomena, no matter which goods they may appear on, are of the 
same nature and have the same origin, and the value in terms of its measure is 
also regulated according to the same principles in all cases. Now that … the price 
of goods is a result of their value for economic men, and that the magnitude of 
the former, under all circumstances, finds its governing principle in that of the 
latter, it is also clear that rent, capital interest, and wages, too, are regulated 
according to the same and general principles ([A]lle Wertherscheinungen, 
hinsichtlich welcher Güter sie auch immer zu Tage treten, derselben Natur sind, 
denselben Ursprung haben und der Werth auch rücksichtlich seines Masses in 
allen Fällen nach den gleichen Principien sich regelt. Da nun ... der Preis der 
Güter eine Folge ihres Werthes für die wirtschafttenden Menschen ist und auch 
die Grösse des erstern unter allen Umständen in jener des letztern ihr 
massgebendes Princip finded, so ist zugleich klar, dass auch die Bodenrente, der 
Capitalzins und der Arbeitslohn sich nach den gleichen allgemeinen Grundsätzen 
regeln). (Menger [1871] 1968, 143)
Land uses, labour performances, and capital uses are either goods of first order or 
goods of higher order according to their respective purpose, and therefore they 
follow the general laws of value (Die Bodennutzungen, die Arbeitsleistungen und 
die Kapitalnutzungen sind je nach ihrer Bestimmung entweder Güter erster oder 
solche höherer Ordnung und sie fallen demnach unter die allgemeinen 
Wertgesetze). (Menger 1923, 161)
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In this way, Menger believes that the value of all goods, regardless of their order, is 
governed by the same and general principles, and therefore this is true of rent, 
wages, and capital interest as a result of the value of ‘land uses, labour performances, 
and capital uses’ qua goods of higher order or productive services. 
Regarding the principles of value Menger argues: ‘The value that goods of 
lower order have for us … cannot be conditioned by the value of the goods of higher 
order that are used for their production. It is rather evident that the value of goods of 
higher order, contrariwise, is always and unexceptionally conditioned by the 
expected value of those goods of lower order whose production they serve’ (Der 
Werth, welchen die Güter niederer Ordnung für uns haben, kann ... nicht durch den 
Werth der Güter höherer Ordnung bedingt sein, welche bei der Production derselben 
verwendet werden, vielmehr ist es klar, dass umgekehrt der Werth der Güter höherer 
Ordnung stets und ausnahmlos durch den voraussichtlichen Werth jener Güter 
niederer Ordnung bedingt ist, zu deren Hervorbringung sie dienen) (see Menger 
[1871] 1968, 124; see also Menger 1923, 144–147). Thus underlining the 
predominance of goods of lower order over goods of higher order as to the 
determination of the value and denying the opposite, Menger insists on the role of 
the value of goods of first order—and, therefore, consumer needs—as the ultimate 
cause of the value of goods in general, together with the irrelevance of the 
production cost of goods to their value. Indeed, Menger states in GV2: ‘We transfer 
the significance that the satisfaction of our needs has for us firstly to (economic) 
goods of first order, and thereby the value comes to make its appearance firstly on 
them in an immediate manner. Just in the case where the goods of first order 
concerned are not available to us in a sufficient quantity for our requirement for 
them, we progressively transfer the value from the goods of first order to the 
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corresponding goods of second, third, and higher order. Hence, the value of 
goods of higher order is conditioned by the expected value of goods of 
lower order whose production they serve’ (Wir übertragen jene Bedeutung, 
welche die Befriedung unserer Bedürfnisse für uns hat, zunächst auf die 
(ökonomischen) Güter erster Ordnung und es gelangt demnach der Güterwert in 
unmittelbarer Weise zunächst bei diesen zur Erscheinung; erst dort, wo die 
bezüglichen Güter erster Ordnung uns in einer für den Bedarf ausreichenden 
Quantität nicht verfügbar sind, übertragen wir denselben fortschreitend von den 
Gütern erster Ordnung auf die entsprechenden Güter zweiter, dritter und höhrer 
Ordnung. Der Wert der Güter höherer Ordnung ist somit bedingt durch 
den voraussichtlichen Wert der Güter niederer Ordnung, zu deren 
Hervorbringung sie dienen) (emphasis in original; see Menger 1923, 144).
It is to be noted here that Menger adds the adjective ‘expected (voraussichtlich)’. 
Indeed, he remarks that ‘This expected value of goods of lower order is … often 
different from the value that similar goods have for us at present, and therefore the 
goods of higher order by means of which we command goods of lower order only 
with consideration for a future period find … the measure of their value not in the 
latter at all, but in the former’ (Dieser voraussichtliche Werth der Güter niederer 
Ordnung ist ... nicht selten von jenem, welchen ähnliche Güter in der Gegenwart für 
uns haben, sehr verschieden, und finden desshalb die Güter höherer Ordnung, durch 
welche wir über Güter niederer Ordnung doch nur mit Rücksicht auf einen künftigen 
Zeitraum verfügen ..., das Mass ihres Werthes keineswegs in dem letztern, sondern 
in dem erstern) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 124–125). Menger emphasises that the 
transformation of goods of higher order to goods of lower order takes time and 
entails uncertainty (see Menger [1871] 1968, 21–26; 1923, 28–31). Time here is 
irrevocable and historical.（₅）   Menger’s insistence on the dependence of goods of 
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higher order on those of lower order and the unrelatedness of production costs with 
respect to value may be derived from his own subjectivism with this perception of 
the time factor in the production process.（６） 
Such an introduction of actuality into his theory differentiates Menger from 
many other neoclassical economists—including his Austrian successors like Eugen 
von Böhm-Bawerk—who took a narrowly static approach presupposing the 
reversibility of economic actions.（7） As a result, Menger did not develop a 
systematic theory of price determination. In this regard Menger contrasts markedly 
with Walras, who focused on the determination of prices in general equilibrium 
based on highly static assumptions. While, like Walras, Menger has a clear notion of 
the so-called perfect competitive market, Menger’s exposition of market exchange 
starts from an illustration of isolated exchange (isolierter Tausch), where the rate of 
exchange cannot be uniquely determined, and then moves on to that of other types of 
exchange with more competitive conditions (see Menger [1871] 1968, 153–212; 
[1883] 1969, 56; 1923, 167–216: Walras 1987a, 221–223).（8）   Here, Menger 
supposes that the principle underlying the isolated exchange applies also to the other 
types of exchange, and, unlike Walras, he does not formulate a principle appropriate 
for competitive markets (see Alter 1990, 165, 177). This may be partly because 
（₅ ）　A. M. Endres (1984, 900) remarks that ‘Historical time reigns supreme in the Grundsätze’.
（₆ ）　Jevons express a view analogous to Menger when he criticises the labour theory of value in 
the following manner: ‘[L]abour once spent has no influence on the future value of any article: it 
is gone and lost for ever. In commerce, by-gones are for ever by-gones; and we are always starting 
clear at each moment, judging the values of things with a view to future utility. Industry is 
essentially prospective, not retrospective; and seldom does the result of any undertaking exactly 
coincide with the first intentions of its promoters’ (emphasis in original; see Jevons 1879, 178). In 
fact, unlike Menger, Jevons admits the impact of production cost on the value of product (see 
Jevons 1879, 178–179, 205–209).
（₇ ）　For overall comparisons between Menger and the typical neoclassical economists on 
theoretical assumptions, see, for example, Max Alter (1982, 211).
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Menger views the development from isolated or monopolistic exchanges to 
competitive exchanges not so much as a logical step but as a historical evolution of 
economic culture (see, for example, Menger [1871] 1968, 179–180, 201–203; 1923, 
213–216). At the beginning of Chapter 5 of GV1, indeed, Menger argues:
Prices or, in other words, the quantities of goods that appear in exchange, even if 
they come to our senses remarkably and therefore form the usual object of 
scientific observation, are by no means the essential of the economic phenomenon 
of exchange. This essential lies rather in the better provision for the satisfaction 
of needs of both exchanging parties brought about by the exchange. The 
economic men make efforts to improve their economic situation as far as they 
possibly can. For this purpose they practice their economic activity in general, 
and for this purpose they also exchange goods whenever thereby the purpose can 
be achieved. Yet, here, prices are merely accidental phenomena, symptoms of 
economic balance between the men’s economy (Die Preise, oder mit andern 
（₈ ）　Menger recognises that in the isolated exchange ‘human arbitrariness … has certain room for 
play, as, within certain limits, various quantities of goods can be exchanged without the relevant 
exchange operations therefore losing their economic character’ (die menscheliche Willkür … 
einen gewissen Spielraum hat, indem innerhalb gewisser Grenzen verschiedene Güterquantitäten 
ausgetauscht werden können, ohne dass darum die bezüglichen Tauschoperationen ihren 
ökonomischen Charakter einbüssen würden) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 179). Even here, however, 
Menger minimises this arbitrariness by arguing that ‘on the supposition of economically equally 
capable individuals and otherwise equal circumstances, we may well posit, as a general rule, that 
both parties’ efforts to gain the greatest possible economic advantage will offset each other, and 
hence the prices will remain equally far from the two extremes, within which they can be 
established’ (werden wir, unter der Annahme ökonomisch gleich tüchtiger Individuen und 
gleicher sonstiger Verhältnisse, als allgemeine Regel aufstellen dürfen, dass das Bestreben beider 
Contrahenten, einen möglichst grossen ökonomischen Vortheil zu erzielen, sich gegenseitig 
paralysiren wird, und demnach auch die Preise von den beiden Extremen, innerhalb welcher sie 
sich bilden können, gleich weit entfernt bleiben werden) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 178; see also 
Menger 1923, 187–188).
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Worten, die im Tausche zur Erscheinung gelangenden Güterquantitäten, so sehr 
sie sich auch unseren Sinnen aufdrängen und desshalb den gewöhnlichsten 
Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen Beobachtung bilden, sind doch nichts weniger 
als das Wesentliche der ökonomischen Erscheinung des Tausches. Dieses liegt 
vielmehr in der durch den Tausch herbeigeführten besseren Vorsorge für die 
Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse der beiden Tauschenden. Die wirtschaftenden 
Menschen haben das Bestreben, ihre ökonomische Lage nach Möglichkeit zu 
verbessern. Zu diesem Zwecke setzen sie ihre wirtschaftliche Thätigkeit 
überhaupt in Bewegung und zu diesem Zwecke tauschen sie auch die Güter aus, 
wo immer hierdurch derselbe erreicht werden kann. Die Preise sind hiebei aber 
lediglich accidentielle Erscheinungen, Symptome des ökonomischen Ausgleiches 
zwischen den menschlichen Wirtschaften). (Menger [1871] 1968, 174)
A similar comment is also made in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 182). While stating that 
‘the price of goods is a result of their value for economic men, and that the 
magnitude of the former, under all circumstances, finds its governing principle in 
that of the latter’, Menger suggests that the prices of goods or their exchange rates 
generally do not correspond to the values that each trader gives to them subjectively 
(see Menger [1871] 1968, 172–175; 1923, 182–186). Here too, Menger differs from 
Walras, who saw the value as equivalent to the ‘rareté (scarcity)’ and demonstrated 
the proportionality between the price and the rareté in subjective equilibrium (see 
Walras 1988, 48, 116, 141–144; Jaffé 1976, 521–522). As Marx Alter (1990, 6) puts 
it, in Menger’s view, ‘values are of the essence of economic life while price [sic] are 
only the surface phenomena of economic activity in the market’. Indeed, Menger 
argues: ‘A right theory of prices cannot ... have the task to explain the alleged but, in 
truth, nowhere existing “equality of value” between two quantities of goods; a task 
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where the subjective character of value and the nature of exchange are completely 
misunderstood. Instead, it must be directed to show how the economic men are led 
to part with goods in their effort towards the fullest possible satisfaction of their 
needs and, more specifically, certain quantities of them each other’ (Eine richtige 
Theorie der Preise kann ... nicht die Aufgabe haben, jene angebliche, in Wahrheit 
aber nirgends bestehende „Werthgleichheit“ zwischen zwei Güterquantitäten zu 
erklären, eine Aufgabe, bei welcher der subjective Charakter des Werthes und die 
Natur des Tausches völlig verkannt werden, sondern muss darauf gerichtet sein, zu 
zeigen, wie die wirthschaftenden Menschen bei ihrem auf die möglichst vollständige 
Befriedigung ihrer Bedürfnisse gerichteten Streben dazu geführt werden, Güter, und 
zwar bestimmte Quantitäten derselben gegeneinander hinzugeben) (see Menger 
[1871] 1968, 175). Thus, to borrow F. A. Hayek’s words, ‘what he [Menger] was 
aiming at was rather to provide tools for what we now call process analysis than for 
a theory of static equilibrium’ (see Hayek 1973, 10).（９） 
As a consequence, Menger did not work up a systematic theory for the 
determination of wages and other prices of productive services. Yet, Menger’s 
statements about the value of goods of higher order like those below suggest that he 
had a conception having an affinity with marginal productivity theory:
[T]he value of a given quantity of a particular good of higher order is … not 
equal to the significance of the satisfactions of needs that depends on the whole 
product whose production it serves, but is just equal to the significance of the 
satisfactions provided for by the partial quantity of the product that would be lost, 
provided that we cannot command the given quantity of the good of higher order 
([D]er Werth einer Quantität eines einzelnen Gutes höherer Ordnung ist ... nicht 
gleich der Bedeutung der Bedürfnissebefriedigungen, welche von dem ganzen 
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Producte abhängen, zu dessen Hevorbringungen es dient, sondern lediglich der 
Bedeutung jener Bedürfnissbefriedigungen, für welche durch die Theilquantität 
des Productes vorgesorgt ist, um welche sich das letztere mindern würde, wofern 
wir über die in Rede stehende Quantität des Gutes höherer Ordung nicht zu 
verfügen vermöchten). (Menger [1871] 1968, 141)
A similar view is also set forth in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 155–158; see also Menger 
[1871] 1968, 138–142).（10）   Furthermore, Menger takes cognisance of the 
substitutability between goods of higher order (see Menger [1871] 1968, 139–141; 
1923, 42–43). Stigler ([1941] 1968, 149–150) and Rothschild (1973, 212–213) 
（₉ ）　‘Menger kept too close to the real world for either the verbal or the symbolic formulation of 
the theory; and in the real world he saw no sharply defined points of equilibrium, but rather 
bounded indeterminancies not only in isolated bilateral barter but also in competitive market 
trading. To quote Streissler, “His [Menger’s] economics in its substantive content was 
disequilibrium economics;” it was also in a broad sense institutional economics’ (Jaffé 1976, 520; 
see also Streissler 1973, 172–173). E. W. Streissler also remarks: ‘[I]t is quite clear in reading 
Menger that Menger was the first great economist who pictured, as a further important dimension 
of his thought, the world as one of imperfect competition … his whole chapter on price theory 
introduces monopoly theory as the general theory, argues that monopoly is much more prevalent 
than is commonly realized’ (emphasis in original; see Streissler 1973, 169). Sandra J. Peart 
(1998) argues that Menger and Jevons, in contrast to Walras, can be ‘homogenised’ in their stress 
on market imperfection and their lack of interest in the theory of price determination.
　  　　 While there is no denying such ‘heretic’ features in Menger’s economics, it is important to 
note the discrepancies between them and ‘the exact direction of theoretical research’ advocated by 
him in UMS as well. Menger effectively admitted in UMS that price theory on the exact direction 
should be developed by assuming Walrasian perfect competition, which can scarcely be achieved, 
as Menger recognised it (see Menger [1883] 1969, 56–58). However, Menger did not apply this 
principle to his price theory not only in VG1 before UMS but also in VG2 thereafter. It may safely 
be said that rather Menger infiltrated a ‘realistic-empirical direction’— according to him, this is 
incompatible with the exact direction—into his main theoretical work in his own way. 
（10 ）　‘Menger eschews any formulation of the theory of production whatsoever. Yet, curiously, he 
is the only one of the three [Menger, Jevons, and Walras] who presents a general marginal 
productivity formulation for the valuation of all factors’ (Streissler 1990a, 168). K. W. Rothschild 
(1973) also rates Menger high as a trailblazer of marginal productivity theory. 
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praise this as one of Menger’s pioneering contributions that Jevons and Walras are 
devoid of.
To recapitulate, Menger advocated the homogeneity of the determination rule 
for wages, rent, and capital interest, although he did not systematically bring forward 
this argument. Furthermore, with stress on the value causality running from goods of 
lower order to goods of higher order, which is an idea akin to marginal productivity 
theory, and the cognition of inter-productive service substitutability, Menger’s 
thinking harbingered the neoclassical doctrine of distribution. 
III　Menger’s conceptions of Labour
It was observed in the preceding section that Menger recognises no essential 
difference between labour and other productive services at least in their economic 
nature.（11）   Indeed, Menger states that ‘Labour performances are only one element 
of the … [production process] and, also, are not economic goods in any higher 
degree than remaining elements of production, especially land- and capital uses’ 
(Die Arbeitsleistungen sind lediglich ein Element des … [Productionsprocesses] und 
auch nicht in höherem Masse ökonomische Güter, als übringen Elemente der 
Production und insbesondere die Boden- und Capitalnutzungen) (see Menger [1871] 
1968, 147). 
Hence, Menger recognises no peculiarity of the rule governing wages: ‘In fact, 
the price of concrete labour performances … are, like that of all the other goods, 
（11 ）　‘[T]he absence of the classicists’ “holy trinity” of land, labor, and capital. Productive factors 
are simply goods of higher order; the services of labor, land, and capital goods are on the same 
footing …. In Menger’s treatment, in fact, specific productive agents are not grouped into 
arbitrary categories which lack economic significance. As a result, his theory of imputation, now 
to be considered, gains a symmetry difficult to secure so long as the classical trichotomy ruled 
economic discussion’ (Stigler [1941] 1968, 151). Rothschild (1973, 211) presents a similar view. 
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governed by their value. This latter, then, is governed … by the magnitude of the 
significance of those satisfactions of needs which we would have to forgo if we were 
unable to command the labour performances in question’ (In Wahrheit regelt sich ... 
auch der Preis concreter Arbeitsleistungen ... gleich jenem aller anderen Güter nach 
ihrem Werthe. Dieser letztere aber regelt sich ... nach der Grösse der Bedeutung 
jener Bedürfnissbefriedigungen, welche wir entbehren müssten, wofern wir über die 
betreffenden Arbeitsleistungen nicht zu verfügen vermöchten) (see Menger [1871] 
1968, 151). Thus, Menger offers a rationalisation of the fact that ‘many labour 
performances of the worker cannot even be exchanged for the bare means of 
subsistence, whereas, for other labour performances, ten-, or twenty-, or even one 
hundred times as many quantity of goods as are necessary for the subsistence of a 
man are to be easily acquired’ (viele Arbeitsleistungen von dem Arbeiter nicht 
einmal gegen die notdürftigsten Subsistenzmittel ausgetauscht werden können, 
während für andere Arbeitsleistungen die zehn-, zwanzig-, und selbst hundertfache 
Quantität der zur Subsistenz eines Menschen erforderlichen Güter leicht zu erlangen 
ist) (see Menger 1923, 166).
In consequence, Menger negates the labour theory of value and exploitation:
Experience teaches us … that numerous goods on which no labour was spent (for 
example, alluvial land, water power, etc.) show economic character everywhere 
when they are available in a quantity that does not meet our requirement, as well 
as, on the other hand, the circumstance that a thing is a product of labour, by 
itself, does not necessarily result even in its having quality of goods, much less 
economic character. Accordingly, the labour expended in a good … cannot be the 
criterion of economic character of goods, and it is rather clear that the criterion is 
to be sought exclusively in the relationship between requirement for and available 
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quantity of goods (Die Erfahrung lehrt uns ... dass zahlreiche Güter, auf welche 
keine Arbeit verwandt wurde (z. B. angeschwemmtes Land, Wasserkräfte etc.) 
den ökonomischen Charakter überall dort aufweisen, wo sie in einer unsern 
Bedarf nicht erreichenden Quantität uns verfügbar sind, wie denn andererseits der 
Umstand, dass ein Ding ein Arbeitsproduct ist, an und für sich nicht einmal die 
Güterqualität, geschweige denn den ökonomischen Charakter desselben zur 
nothwendigen Folge hat. ... die auf ein Gut aufgewendete Arbeit kann demnach 
nicht das Kriterium des ökonomischen Charakters der Güter sein, es ist vielmehr 
klar, dass dasselbe ganz ausschliesslich in dem Verhältnisse zwischen Bedarf und 
verfügbarer Quantität derselben zu suchen ist). (Menger [1871] 1968, 61)
Labour performances are only an element of the … [production] process and also 
are not economic goods in higher measure than the remaining elements of 
production, especially land- and capital uses. Accordingly, capital- and land 
owners also do not live on what they take way from workers, but on their capital- 
and land uses that are as valuable as labour performances for individual and 
society (Die Arbeitsleistungen sind lediglich ein Element des ... Processes und 
auch nicht in höherem Masse ökonomische Güter, also die übrigen Elemente der 
Production und inbesondere die Boden- und Capitalnutzungen. Die Capital- und 
Grundbesitzer leben demnach auch nicht von dem, was sie den Arbeitern 
entziehen, sondern von ihren Capital- und Bodennutzungen, welche für 
Ind iv idnum und  Gese l l schaf t  ebenso  wohl  Wer th  haben ,  a l s  d ie 
Arbeitsleistungen). (Menger [1871] 1968, 147)
What, then, does Menger think about workers’ motivations behind their labour 
supply? In GV1, he writes:
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A special characteristic of labour performances that also affects the relevant value 
phenomena lies in the fact that some of them are connected with unpleasant 
feelings for the worker, and therefore they will not easily be effected if not in 
exchange for economic advantages that arise from their activity. Accordingly, 
this kind of works cannot easily attain the non-economic character for society. 
Meanwhile, the value that inactivity generally has for the worker, in fact, is 
heavily overestimated compared with the rule. The occupations of by far the 
greater majority of men grant them joy and are a true satisfaction of needs for 
them, and would also be practiced, albeit in smaller measure or in a modified 
way, if they were not forced to the exertion of their powers driven by necessity. 
The operations of his power are a need of every sound man, and if, nevertheless, 
only a small number of people work without expectation of economic advantages, 
the reason lies not so much in the unpleasantness of work in general as, rather, in 
the fact that opportunity for rewarding work is sufficiently available (Eine 
besondere Eigenthümlichkeit der Arbeitsleistungen, welche auch auf die 
bezüglichen Wertherscheinungen einwirkt, besteht darin, dass ein Theil derselben 
für den Arbeiter mit unangenehmen Empfindungen verbunden ist und demnach 
nicht leicht anders als gegen ökonomische Vortheile, welche demselben aus 
seiner Thätigkeit entstehen, wirksam wird. Arbeiten dieser Art können desshalb 
für die Gesellschaft nicht leicht den nicht ökonomischen Charakter erlangen. 
Indess wird der Werth, welchen die Unthätigkeit im Allgemeinen für den Arbeiter 
hat, der Regel nach denn doch stark überschätzt. Die Beschäftigungen der weitaus 
grössern Mehrzahl von Menschen gewähren ihnen Freude, sind für dieselben eine 
wahre Bedürfnissbefriedigung und würden, wenn auch in geringerem Masse, 
oder in modificirter Weise, auch dann ausgeübt werden, wenn die Menschen 
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durch die Noth zur Entfaltung ihrer Kräfte nicht gezwungen würden. Die 
Bethätigung seiner Kraft ist für jeden wohlorganisirten Menschen Bedürfniss, 
und wenn nichtsdestoweniger nur wenige Personen ohne Aussicht auf 
wirtschaftliche Vortheile arbeiten, so liegt der Grund hievon nicht so sehr in der 
Unannehmlichkeit der Arbeit im Grossen und Ganzen, als vielmehr darin, dass 
Gelegenheit genug zur lohnenden Arbeit vorhanden ist). (Menger [1871] 1968, 
149)
Menger also makes a similar explanation in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 165).
In this manner, unlike Jevons, Menger marginalises the notion of labour as pain 
and, rather, holds that labour is generally accompanied by pleasure. Also, as can be 
seen from the last sentence of the above quotation, he advocates an opportunity cost 
theory of labour supply. Thus, Menger may be regarded as the precursor of the 
Austrian labour doctrine (see Spencer 2009, 75–79).
Furthermore, Menger’s demarcation between ‘work technically (technisch 
arbeiten)’ and ‘witrschaften (have an economy)’, stated in Chapter 4 of GV2, typifies 
his angle on labour. In Menger’s view, the latter is none other than ‘discretionary 
activities aimed at the final fulfilment of our requirement for goods (auf die endliche 
Deckung unseres Güterbedarfes hinzielenden dispositiven Tätigkeit)’, and the former 
is just one of the objective means of the activities.（12）  Menger remarks that it is both 
（12 ）　Menger maintains that the failure to distinguish ‘technical labour (technische Arbeit)’ from 
‘economy in the subjective meaning (Wirtschaft im subjektiven Sinne)’ in the past economics, 
especially in the British political economy since Adam Smith and David Ricardo, led to the 
wrong notion that technical labour is the sole source of wealth, the sole element of value 
formation, and the true standard of the value of all kinds of goods (see Menger 1923, 63).
　  　　In GV1, Menger also referred to ‘technical labour performances (technische 
Arbeitsleistungen)’, but he did not articulate the distinction between them and economy (see 
Menger [1871] 1968, 136–138).
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possible to work technically without having an economy, like artists and scholars, 
and to have an economy without working technically, like entrepreneurs and 
housewives. Moreover, Menger adds:
[T]he wage-worker does not have an economy while he does technical works for 
another person’s economy; he has an economy while he sells his labour 
performances for the fulfilment of his requirement for goods ([D]er Lohnarbeiter 
wirtschaftet nicht, indem er technische Arbeiten für eine fremde Wirtshcaft 
verrichtet; er wirtschaftet, indem er seine Arbeitsleistungen um der Deckung 
seines Güterbedarfes willen veräußert). (Menger 1923, 63)
This passage not only supplements Menger’s opportunity cost theory of labour 
supply, but also contains the following implication. That is, the object of Menger’s 
economic study on the worker’s behaviour is restricted to labour supply in the 
market ‘for the fulfilment of his requirement for goods’, or in pursuit of maximum 
wages, and actual labour and the worker’s motivation behind it are excluded from 
the object. Hence, Pagano makes a good point when he says:
[T]he personality of Menger’s individual is so disunited that he recalls very 
closely what psychiatrists define as a schizophrenic personality. On the one hand, 
he is well aware of his needs when these needs concern the objects that he 
consumes; and on the other hand, the same individual treats the allocation of 
himself in production as the allocation of any superior-order object. In addition, 
this individual is indifferent to the needs that can be satisfied or dissatisfied by 
different human activities of production. (Pagano 1985, 84)
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Thus, Menger’s perception of labour is not merely characterised by his 
insistence on the dependence of the value of labour as a productive service on that of 
the product, which is premised on the supremacy of consumption over production; it 
further underrates the significance of the labour process and industrial relations 
there. This problem will be dealt with again in Section V.
IV  Menger on Labour Policy and the Role of Capital Accumulation and 
Entrepreneurship
In Die Irrtümer des Hitorismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie (1884), Menger 
contends that he is never such ‘an advocate of the Manchester Party (ein Anhänger 
der Machesterpartei)’, i.e., a dyed-in-the wool believer in lasses-faire as Gustav 
Schmoller dubbed him. Menger adds that: ‘I would like to devote my small power to 
the investigation into the law by which the economic life of men is formed; 
meanwhile, nothing is farther from my direction than the service in the interest of 
capitalism’ (Ich möchte meine geringe Kraft der Erforschung jener Gesezte widmen, 
nach welchen das wirtschaftliche Leben der Menschen sich gestaltet; nichts liegt 
meiner Richtung ferner, als der Dienst im Interesse des Capitalismus) (see Menger 
[1884] 1970, 92–93).
Indeed, in the manuscript of Menger’s lectures to Crown Prince Rudolf in 
February, 1876, which was also noted by the prince (hereafter LF76), it is written 
that ‘If a few’s egoism and their greed presents an obstacle to the interest of many, 
the time has come when the state should defend the equal rights of all and must 
interfere resolutely with the activities of the individual and must put his egoism in 
his legal place for the benefit of the all’ (Wenn der Egoismus einzelner und ihre 
Gewinnsucht den Interessen vieler ein Hidernis bietet, ist der Moment gekommen, in 
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dem der Staat die gleichen Rechte aller wahren soll, und zum Wohle des Ganzen 
kräfig in die Tätigkeiten des einzelnen eingreifen und dessen Egoismus in die 
gesetzlichen Schranken weisen muß) (emphasis in original; see E. W. Streissler and 
M. Streissler 1994, 124).（13）  For instance, a minimal tax on the poor and a 
progressive tax on the rich are endorsed in LF76 (see E. W. Streissler and M. 
Streissler 1994, 196, 198). Also, in a transcript of Menger’s lectures on public 
finance at the University of Vienna in 1888, it is suggested that a monopoly of 
tobacco is preferable to that of sugar since the former falls less on the poor than the 
latter (see Mizobata 1993, 64).
LF76 also contains the following passage:
Naturally, it is a major concern of the state that a very large part of its population 
and certainly one of the main constituents of the whole society, that is, workers, 
in addition to their fatally miserable living conditions, shall not undergo further 
new suffering solely by the arbitrariness of a few rich people only for their own 
（13 ）　The following passage is also found in LF76: ‘The egoistic interest of individuals, because of 
a momentary advantage, can often lead to the implementation of an act that certainly does not 
overstep the limits of the free use of property, but, nevertheless, can bring about a lasting damage 
to many, and even to the owner. In this case it is the duty of the state to prevent this misfortune 
by good tips or ordinances; it is, to be true, a strong intervention in economic efforts of the 
individual, which, however, is only qualified when the interest of the whole threatened by the 
egoism of the individual requires it and therefore the protective caution of the whole becomes 
necessary’ (Das egoistische Interesse einzelner kann oft wegen eines momentanen Vorteils zur 
Ausführung einer Handlung führen, die zwar die Grenzen der freien Benützung des Eigentumes 
nicht überschreitet, aber dennoch für viele, und selbst für den Eigentümer, einen dauernden 
Schaden herbeiführen kann. In diesem Falle ist es die Sache des Staates, dieses Unheil durch gute 
Ratschläge oder durch Verordnungen zu verhindern; es ist zwar ein starker Eingriff in die 
wirtschaftlichen Bestrebungen des einzelnen, der aber nur dort bedingt ist, wo das durch den 
Egoismus des einzelnen bedrohte Interesse der Gesamtheit es erfordert, und daher die schützende 
Vorsicht der Gesamtheit zur Notwendigkeit wird) (emphasis in original; see E. W. Streissler and 
M. Streissler 1994, 130).
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benefit (Es ist natürlich ein Hauptinteresse des Staates, daß ein so großer Teil 
seiner Bevölkerung und gerade einer der Hauptfaktoren im großen Ganzen, 
nämlich die Arbeiter, nur durch die Willkür einzelner Reicher zum bloßen Wohle 
dieser, bei ihrer ohnedies kümmerlichen Lebensweise nicht noch neue Leiden 
hinzugefügt bekommen). (Emphasis in original; see E. W. Streissler and M. 
Streissler 1994, 126).
Thus, it is argued in LF76 that the onus lies on the state to intervene in wealthy 
factory owners’ exertions and prevent them from gaining additional profits if 
necessary (see E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 128). It is also noted there 
that the state should do its best to raise the conditions of the working class and ease 
their misery when it is exposed to the public eye (see E. W. Streissler and M. 
Streissler 1994, 50).
Accordingly, in the words of Kiichiro Yagi (2004, 49), Menger could be ‘an 
interventionist to the extent that he thinks it a duty of the state to do everything in its 
power to improve the status of the working class and alleviate their distress’. From 
what can be seen in LF76, however, Menger’s proposals are rather equivocal and 
conservative. For instance, Menger emphasises the ‘corruptive evil (verderbliches 
Übel)’ of child labour because of its impediment to the physical and intellectual 
development of the workers. Yet, Menger does not specify the means to deter it (see 
E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 128). Menger also espouses the 
governmental prohibition of more than fifteen-hour work day (see E. W. Streissler 
and M. Streissler 1994, 126, 128). However, as Ikeda (2010, 9) puts it, ‘If one works 
for 15 hours, as is indicated here, he or she will be left with only nine hours in the 
day, which is almost equivalent to total sleeping hours plus a short time for 
breakfast, lunch and dinner. Indeed, this concept must be acceptable for almost all 
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capitalists, including those seeking to exploit their workers up to 15 hours a day’.
Moreover, ‘the iron law of wages (das eiserne Lohngestez)’ is recognised in 
LF76 as containing the major principle of every wage determination and concerning 
the most populous stratum of workers. As a consequence, it is maintained that 
unskilled civil servants’ wages should be set at the minimum subsistence level (see 
E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 152, 154, 156).
In fact, it is also stated in LF76 : ‘The individual citizen knows best what is of 
use to him, and he develops the greatest industriousness when he works for his own 
interest. Furthermore, in a cultivated nation, we must regard the awareness of the 
contribution to the improvement of the general well-being by the own efforts as a 
remarkable incentive to work’ (Der einzelne Bürger weiß am besten, was ihm von 
Nutz ist, und wird, da er für sein eigenstes Interesse arbeitet, den größten Fleiß 
entwickeln. Als einen nennenswerten Antrieb zur Arbeit muß man ferner in einem 
kultivierten Staate das Bewußtsein der Mitwirkung zur Hebung des allgemeinen 
Wohlstandes durch die eigenen Bestrebungen betrachten); hence, state controls 
imposing stereotyped policies on citizens are viewed as a serious hindrance to the 
development of society as a whole by hampering the diversity of individual 
preferences and activities and the incentive to work (emphasis in original; see E. W. 
Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 108, 110, 112, 114). In this fashion, self-interest is 
assumed to harmonise with public benefit as a rule. 
Thus, it is insisted in LF76:
With a still uncultivated people, the head of the state can seek to lift the stark 
sluggish economy by his own intervention; yet, where trade and commerce 
flourish by industriousness and education, the state can immensely damage 
citizens’ interest by excessive interference, whereas it most definitely promotes 
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the interest of the national economy by admission of room for free play and of 
assistance only in the case when individuals’ power is too weak (Bei einem noch 
unkultivierten Volke kann das Haupt des Staates durch eigenes Eingreifen die 
vollkommen darniederliegende Volkswirtschaft zu heben suchen; doch, wo durch 
Fleiß und Bildung das Gewerbe und der Handel blühen, kann der Staat durch 
allzugroße Einmengung in die Interesses der Bürger ungemein schaden, während 
er durch Zulassung eines freien Spielraumes und Hilfe nur in jenen Fällen, wo die 
Kraft der einzelnen zu scwach ist, am sichersten die volkswirtschaftlichen 
Interessen fördert). (Emphasis in original: E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 
1994, 108, 110)
Freedom and self-responsibility of citizens in their economic efforts are the 
foundations of the general development of a nation; therefore, the state must 
realise and defend these main principles. By the opposite, that is, by the 
paternalistic system, it debilitates and undermines its own progress and infringes 
the natural rights of its citizens (Freiheit und Selbstverantwortlichkeit der Bürger 
in ihren wirtschaftlichen Bestrebungen sind die Grundfesten der allgemeinen 
Entwicklung eines Staates; darum muß dieser diese Hauptprinzipien ermöglichen 
und schützen. Durch das Gegenteil, durch das Bevormundungssystem, schwächt 
und untergräbt er seinen eigenen Fortschritt und versündigt sich an den 
natürlichsten Rechten seiner Bürger). (E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 
114)
In LJ76, communism and socialism are criticised as systems spoiling people’s 
freedom and self-responsibility (see E. W. Streissler and M. Streissler 1994, 48, 50).
Thus, as Streissler (1990b, 113–121) explains, it may be fair to say that Menger 
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took a minimalist position on state interventions in general and was ‘very modest’ as 
to the labour policy.
Here, Menger may be considered to remain at a level akin to that of classical 
economists. This is concretely shown in ‘Die Social-Theorien der Classischen 
National-Oekonomie und die Moderne Wirtschaftspolitik’ (hereafter SCM), 
published in 1891.（14）    Menger wrote this article against the background of the 
centenary of Adam Smith’s death. Citing the cool response to this anniversary in the 
German speaking world, Menger underlined the decline of classical political 
economy on the soil. At its rear, Menger observed the atrophy of liberalism and the 
rise of the social politics school (die social-politischen Schule), which pervaded not 
only academe but also political areas in Germany and Austria (see Menger [1891] 
1970, 219–223). Under these circumstances, Menger pointed out, classical political 
economy was regarded as ‘capitalistic, atomistic, abstract, and an enemy of the 
people (kapitalistisch, atomistisch, abstract, volksfeindlich)’ and thus as misleading 
and able to be rejected in German academe (see Menger [1891] 1970, 220).
Menger argues that this hostility resulted from the misconception by the social 
politics school that confused classical political economy with the Manchesterite 
doctrine. He states: ‘It is not true that the newer German social politics school stands 
in factual contrast to classical political economy’ (Es is nicht wahr, dass die neuere 
social-politische Schule Deutschlands in sachlichem Gegensatz zu der classischen 
National-Oekonomie stehet) (see Menger [1891] 1970, 222–223).
They say, Menger notes, that ‘in all cases of conflict of interests between the 
poor and the rich and between the strong and the weak, Adam Smith is 
unexceptionally on the side of the latter [the rich and the strong]’ (Adam Smith stellt 
（14 ）　For the arguments in SCM, see also Ikeda (2010, 11–14).
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sich in allen Fällen des Interessen-Conflictes zwischen den Armen und den Reichen, 
zwischen den Starken und Schwachen ausnahmslos auf die Seite der Letzteren [sic]). 
Menger continues that, in fact, such a passage is found nowhere in Smith’s works 
and remarks that ‘So highly A. Smith values the free initiative of the individual in 
economic matters, so energetically he defends state interventions in any cases where 
it is concerned with the legislation or legal application that forces the expulsion of 
poor and weak people in the interests of rich and powerful people’ (So hoch A. 
Smith die freie Initiative des Individuums in wirtschaftlichen Dingen stellt, so 
energisch tritt er doch überall dort für staatliche Eingriffe ein, wo es sich um die 
Beseitigung der Armen und Schwachen zu Gunsten der Reichen und Mächtigen 
bedrückenden Gesetzgebung oder Gesetzanwendung handelt) (see Menger [1891] 
1970, 223).
Menger argues that Smith objected to mercantile regulations on residence and 
the wages of his age because they were unfavourable to the poor and the weak. 
Meanwhile, Menger adds, Smith seldom opposed state intervention for the benefit of 
the poor and the weak; for example, Smith was even for legal determinations of 
wage levels in so far as they profited workers, and he approved of the law to compel 
masters to pay their workers not in kind but in money (see Menger [1891] 1970, 
223–224). Menger also points out that in terms of the protection of the poor and the 
weak Smith’s principal standpoint was partially more progressive than that of ‘social 
politicians (Social-Politiker)’ of Menger’s age, so that socialists like Louis Blanc, 
Ferdinand Lassalle, and Marx constantly referred to the theory of Smith and his 
disciples (see Menger [1891] 1970, 224–225).  
Furthermore, Menger stresses that such classical economists following Smith as 
Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and Jean Baptiste Say, too, ardently espoused 
policies to improve the status of workers (see Menger [1891] 1970, 224–229). 
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Hence, Menger concludes that: ‘It is none other than a defilement of the historical 
truth if the disciples who carry on Smith’s doctrine in his spirit are assessed as 
representatives of a cruel and exploitative capitalism, as is the case with A. Smith’s 
own’ (Es ist kein geringerer Frevel gegen die hitorische Wahrheit, wenn die die 
Lehren Smith’s in seinem Geiste fortbildenden Schüler dessselben als Vertreter eines 
grausamen, ausbeuterischen Kapitalismus hingestellt werden, als dies rücksichtlich 
A. Smith’s selbst der Fall ist) (see Menger [1891] 1970, 229). Menger adds that 
Smith and other classical economists were never proponents of laissez-faireism and 
they also upheld state interventions in various economic issues as well as labour 
problems (see Menger [1891] 1970, 230–233).
Thus, Menger states: ‘What actually distinguishes classical political economy 
from the modern social politics school in the worker problem is by no means the 
tendency. Both recognise the unfavourable economic situation of a large part of the 
working population, both ask for a change in the interests of workers, and neither of 
them turns down state aids in principle’ (Was die classische National-Oekonomie 
von der Schule der modernen Social-Politiker in der Arbeiterfrage thatsächlich 
unterscheidet, ist keineswegs die Tendenz. Beide anerkennen die ungünstige 
ökonomische Lage eines grossen Theiles der Arbeiter-Bevölkerung, beide verlangen 
eine Aenderung zu Gunsten der Arbeiter, keine derselben weist die Staatshilfe 
principiell zurück) (see Menger [1891] 1970, 234). Menger explains that the 
difference between classical political economy and the social politics school lies in 
the fact that, in the former, improvements of the economic situation of workers were 
first expected by removing all public institutions that disadvantageously affected 
workers’ earnings, and positive state interventions in the national economy were 
viewed as able to be recommended only when workers’ self-help and their free 
confederation did not suffice to achieve improvements, whereas, in the latter, the 
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main emphasis was laid on positive state intervention after a large part of the 
legislation that had forced the expulsion of poor and weak people in the interests of 
the propertied classes had been removed (see Menger [1891] 1970, 234). 
Accordingly, Menger remarks, ‘The economic policy of classical political economy 
corresponded exactly to the most urgent need of the age’ (Die Wirtschaftspolitik der 
classischen National-Oekonomie entsprach genau dem nächsten und dringendsten 
Bedürfnisse der Zeit), and therefore Smith and his disciples deserve to be called 
social politicians for their age (see Menger [1891] 1970, 235).
Menger continues:
In respect of their worker-friendly tendency, the classical economists do not in 
the least fall behind the modern social politicians. In another respect, the 
standpoint of classical political economy seems to considerably excel that of our 
newer social politicians beyond doubt to me. I mean the right insight into the 
causes on which the benefit of the working classes depends. The fact that the 
situation of workers is dependent not only on positive legislative policies but at 
least equally on the progressive accumulation of capital and the enterprising spirit 
of those who have it at their disposal is too much misunderstood at present. The 
one-sided tendency against all that is called capital and enterprise seems to have 
made the newer social politics school blind to the recognition of this truth and the 
resulting practical consequences. It is true that the distribution of income between 
the capital and the labour per se is a problem of highest importance, and each 
policy by which a larger share of the result of production accrues to the labour 
without threatening the existence of the industry must be hailed as a delightful 
social progress. Yet, it also seems to me just as certain that a considerable rise in 
wages can result only from the progressive accumulation and productive use of 
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capital; rather, the employment of an increasing number of working population at 
wages that are rising or even keep rising can go only hand in hand with the 
improvement of productive businesses and capital accumulation. Those who, 
quite one-sidedly, aim at only distribution of product between entrepreneurs and 
workers that is as favourable to the working class as possible overlook the fact 
that the distribution expected from here for the working class, even if its 
importance as such is great, is narrowly limited and inferior to that which grows 
out of the increase in capital and its productive use by itself (Stehen die 
classischen Volkswirthe in Rücksicht auf ihre arbeiterfreundliche Tendenz den 
modernen Social-Politikern zum mindesten nicht nach, so scheint mir der 
Standpunkt der classischen National-Oekonomie in einer andern Rücksicht jenem 
unserer neueren Social-Politiker dagegen zweifellos bedeutend überlegen zu sein. 
Ich meine die richtige Einsicht in die Ursachen, von welchen das Wohl der 
arbeitenden Classen abhängt. Dass die Lage der Arbeiter, nicht nur von positiven 
Gesetzgebungs-Massregeln, sondern zum mindesten ebensosehr von der 
fortschreitenden Ansammlung des Kapitals und vom Unternehmungsgeiste 
derjenigen, welche darüber verfügen, abhängig ist, wird gegenwärtig nur allzu 
sehr verkannt. Die einseitige Tendenz gegen Alles, was Kapital und Unternehmung 
heisst, scheint die neueren social-politischen Schulen gegen die Anerkennung 
dieser Wahrheit und der aus ihr resultirenden praktischen Consequenzen blind 
gemacht zu haben. Es ist richtig, dass die Vertheilung des Einkommens zwischen 
dem Kapital und der Arbeit an sich ein Problem von höchster Wichtigkeit ist und 
jede Massregel, wodurch der Arbeit, ohne dass die Existenzfähigkeit der Industrie 
in Frage gestellt wird, ein grösserer Antheil an den Ergebnissen der Produktion 
zufällt, als ein erfreulicher gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt begrüsst werden muss. 
Ebenso sicher scheint mir aber auch zu sein, dass eine beträchtliche Steigerung 
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der Löhne nur die Folge der fortschreitenden Ansammlung und productiven 
Verwendung von Kapital zu sein vermag, ja die Beschäftigung einer sich 
vermehrenden Arbeiter-Bevölkerung zu steigenden oder selbst zu den 
bestehenden Löhnen nur Hand in Hand mit dem Aufschwunge der productiven 
Gewerbe und der Kapitals-Ansammlung gehen kann. Diejenigen, welche, 
einseitig genug, nur eine dem Arbeiterstande möglichst günstige Vertheilung des 
Productes zwischen Unternehmer und Arbeiter im Auge haben, übersehen, dass 
die für den Arbeiterstand hieraus zu erwartenden Vortheile, so gross ihre 
Wichtigkeit an sich ist, doch eng begrenzt sind und gegenüber jenen, welche 
denselben aus der Vermehrung des Kapitals und seiner productiven Verwandung 
von selbst erwachsen, an Bedeutung zurückstehen). (Menger [1891] 1970, 239–
240)
In this fashion, Menger underscores the indispensability of capital accumulation and 
entrepreneurship for the well-being of the working class. 
Thus, stating that ‘Adam Smith and his school always defend public interest, 
not class interest (Adam Smith und seine Schule treten stets für das Gemeinwohl, 
nicht für Classen-Interessen ein)’, Menger contrasts this perspective with the 
German social-politics school’s ‘doctrinism (Doctrinarismus)’ typified by ‘blind 
hostility to capital and enterprising spirit, and to each individual’s initiative and self-
responsibility in economic matters (eine blinde Gegnerschaft gegen Kapital, 
Unternehmungsgeist und gegen jede individuelle Initiative und Selbstveranwortlickeit 
in wirtchaftlichen Dingen)’ (see Menger [1891] 1970, 242, 245).（15）
It may safely be said that Menger’s view above can be derived from his theory. 
In GV1, he argues: ‘Adam Smith … made the progressive division of labour the 
main point of the economic progress of mankind; indeed, it is in harmony with the 
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overwhelming significance that he attaches to the labour element in human economy. 
However, I believe that in his chapter on the division of labour, the distinguished 
scholar ... only shed light on a single cause of the progressive well-being of mankind, 
but other no less effective causes escaped his observation’ (Adam Smith hat ... die 
fortscreitende Arbeitstheilung zum Angelpunkte des wirtschaftlichen Fortschrittes 
der Menschen gemacht, und zwar im Einklange mit der überwiegenden Bedeutung, 
welche er dem Arbeitselemente in der menschenlichen Wirtschaft einräumt. Ich 
glaube indess, dass der ausgezeichnete Forscher ... in seinem Capital über die 
Arbeitstheilung nur eine einzelne Ursache des fortschreitenden Wohlstandes der 
Menschen an’s Licht gezogen hat, andere nicht minder wirksame jedoch seiner 
Beobachtung entgangen sind) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 27). 
Menger continues that: ‘If a people ... , instead of limiting themselves to the 
（15 ）　In UMS, on the other hand, Menger argued that Smith and his disciples lacked understanding 
of ‘the social institutions that emerge unreflectingly and their significance for the national 
economy (die auf unreflectirtem Wege entstandenen gesellscaftlichen Institutionen und die 
Bedeutung der letzteren für die Volkswirtschaft)’ and criticised their ‘pragmatism 
(Pragmatismus)’ assuming that ‘the institutions of the national economy are unexceptionally the 
product of the common will of society as such, results of explicit agreement of members of 
society or of positive legislation’ (die Institutionen der Volkswirtschaft seien durchweg das 
beabsichtige Product des Gemeinwillens der Gesellschaft als solcher, Ergebnisse der 
ausdrücklichen Uebereinkunft der Gesellschaftsglieder oder der positiven Gesetzgebung) (see 
Menger [1883] 1969, 200–201).
　  　　Menger also remarked in UMS that: ‘It is the one-sided rationalistic liberalism, the frequently 
impetuous effort for the removal of what exists, not always sufficiently understood, and the just as 
impetuous impulse to create something new in the realm of state institutions— often enough 
without adequate expertise and experience— that characterises A. Smith’s and his disciples’ 
doctrines’ (Es ist der einseitige rationalistische Liberalismus, das nicht selten übereilte Streben 
nach Beseitigung des Bestehenden, nicht immer genügend Verstandenen, der ebenso übereilte 
Drang, auf dem Gebiete staatlicher Einrichtungen Neues zu schaffen—oft genug ohne 
ausreichende Sachkenntniss und Erfahrung—, was die Lehren A. Smith’s und seiner Schüler 
charakterisirt) (see Menger [1883] 1969, 207).
　  　　Thus, to borrow Hayekian terms, classical economists, in Menger’s opinion, are misled into 
constructivist rationalism and neglect of spontaneous order.
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occupational activity that is based on the collection of available goods of lower order 
(in the most primitive condition of mankind, mostly goods of first order and, 
perhaps, of second order), grasp goods of third, fourth, and higher order and progress 
to the mobilisation of goods for the satisfaction of their needs to increasingly higher 
degree, we, with appropriate division of labour in particular, will certainly be able to 
perceive that progress in well-being which Adam Smith was disposed to exclusively 
attribute to the latter condition’ (Greift … ein Volk, anstatt sich lediglich auf die 
occupatorische Thätigkeit, das ist auf das Aufsammeln der vorhandenen Güter 
niederer Ordnung, (in den rohesten Zuständen der Menschen zumeist Güter erster 
und etwa zweiter Ordnung,) zu beschränken, zu den Gütern dritter, vierter und 
höherer Ordnung und schreitet dasselbe in der Heranziehung von Gütern zur 
Befriedigung seiner Bedürfnisse zu immer höherer Ordungen fort, so werden wir, 
zumal bei zwechmässiger Theilung der Arbeit, allerdings jenen Fortschritt in seinem 
Wohlstande wahrnehmen können, welchen Adam Smith ausschliesslich dem letztern 
Umstande zuzuschreiben geneigt war) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 27–28).
In this manner, Menger indicates that the development of the division of labour 
constitutes just one factor for the growth in economic welfare, and he stresses the 
improvement of roundabout production, that is, capital accumulation as another 
factor, now pointing out Smith’s insufficient understanding of this issue.（16）   Similar 
explanations are also made in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 94–101). Menger further 
states in GV1:
（16 ）　‘The longer the period that a production takes, certainly the higher, all other things being 
equal, its productivity and also the greater the value of capital use’ (Je länger der Zeitraum ist, 
welchen eine Production in Anspruch nimmt, um so höher ist allredings under sonst gleichen 
Umständen die Productivität derselben, um so grösser aber auch der Werth der Capitalbenützung) 
(see Menger [1871] 1968, 136). For Menger’s detailed discussions on the theory of capital, see 
Menger ([1883] 1970).
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The process of the transformation of goods of higher order into those of lower 
order or into goods of first order, if it is otherwise economic, is further 
conditioned, under all circumstances, by the fact that an economic subject 
prepares for it and leads it in an economic sense, and he also performs … 
economic calculations and provides or lets others provide the process with goods 
of higher order including technical labour performances. This so-called 
entrepreneurial activity, which, at the beginnings of culture and later, too, still in 
the small business, is normally developed by the same economic subject that 
intervenes in the production process by his technical labour performances, now 
frequently needs the full time of the economic subject in question with the 
progressive division of labour and enlargement of enterprises; hence, it is as 
necessary an element of production of goods as technical labour performances 
and has the character of a good of higher order and, since it is normally an 
economic good like the latter, value as well (Der Prozeß der Umgestaltung von 
Gütern höherer Ordnung in solche niederer Ordnung, beziehungsweise in Güter 
erster Ordnung, soll er anders ein ökonomischer sein, ist ferner unter allen 
Umständen dadurch bedingt, dass ein wirtschaftendes Subject denselben 
vorbereite und in ökonomischen Sinne leite, also die ökonomischen Berechnungen 
... anstelle und die Güter höherer Ordnung, einschließlich der technischen 
Arbeitsleistugen, dem Processe thatsächlich zuführe oder zuführen lasse. Diese 
sogennante Unternehmertätigkeit, welche in den Anfängen der Cultur und auch 
später noch beim Kleingewerbe der Regel nach von demselben wirtschaftenden 
Subjecte entwickelt wird, welches auch durch seine technischen Arbeitsleistungen 
in den Productionsprocess eingreift, bei fortschreitender Theilung der Arbeit und 
Vergrösserung der Unternehmungen jedoch nicht selten die volle Zeit des 
betreffenden wirtschaftenden Subjectes in Anspruch nimmt, ist desshalb ein eben 
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so nothwendiges Element der Gütererzeugung wie die technischen 
Arbeitsleistungen und hat den Charakter eines Gutes höherer Ordnung, und zwar, 
da dieselbe gleich den letzteren der Regel nach ein ökonomisches Gut ist, auch 
Werth). (Menger [1871] 1968, 136–137)
The same statement is also made in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 153–154). 
Thus, Menger attributes the leading role in the production process to the 
entrepreneur—especially, in Menger’s view laying emphasis on the factor of 
uncertainty in ‘the transformation of goods of higher order into those of lower 
order’, the entrepreneur requires due ability of ‘economic calculations’ and decision 
making—and he observes that entrepreneurship grew to be a proper function 
independent of ‘technical labour’ with the development of the division of labour and 
size of firms—therefore, of capital accumulation.（17）   While stating ‘The 
entrepreneuria l  act iv i ty , too, is to count definitely among the labour 
pe r fo rmances  (Zu  den  Arbe i t s l e i s tungen  i s t  en t sch ieden  auch  d i e 
Unternehmerthä t igke i t  zu rechnen)’, Menger distinguishes between 
entrepreneurship and ‘technical labour’ by remarking that ‘The journal owner … , 
more often than not, is also a contributor to his journal and the manufacturing 
entrepreneur also a worker; yet, both are entrepreneurs not owing to their technical 
contribution in the production process, but owing to the fact that they provide goods 
of higher order for a certain purpose of production through their economic 
（17 ）　Menger mentions that entrepreneurial activity includes: (a) the information on the economic 
situation (die Information über die wirtschaftliche Sachlage), (b) the economic calculation (das 
wirtschaftliche Calcü1), (c) the act of will by which goods of higher order are devoted to a certain 
production (der Willenact, durch welchen Güter höherer Ordnung einer bestimmten Production 
gewidmet werden), and (d) the supervision of the best possible economic implementation of the 
production plan (die Ueberwachung der möglichst ökonomischen Durchführung des 
Productionsplanes) (see Menger [1871] 1968, 137).
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calculation and eventually through an act of will’ (Der Journaleigenthümer ist ... 
nicht selten zugleich Mitarbeiter seines Journales, der Gewerbeunternehmer zugleich 
Arbeiter, Unternehmer sind beide jedoch nicht durch ihre technische Mitwirkung 
beim Productionsprocesse, sondern dadurch, dass sie Güter höherer Ordnung durch 
ihr wirtschaftliches Calcül und schliesslich durch einen Willensact einem 
bestimmten Productionszwecke zuführen) (emphasis in original; Menger [1871] 
1968, 137, 149).
In sum, Menger sees capital accumulation and entrepreneurship, along with the 
division of labour, as essentials for increments in general welfare, thus denying the 
conflict of interest between capital and labour and between the employer and the 
employee. Accordingly, for all his allegation that ‘nothing is farther from my 
direction than the service in the interest of capitalism’, Menger proves to be a 
staunch defender of the capitalist order.
V　Walras, Jevons, and Menger: Foundation for Neoclassical Theory of Labour
Having extensively treated Menger’s thought on labour, let us now compare it with 
the thought of Walras and Jevons, who are the other two of the triumvirate of the 
Marginalist Revolution. This attempt will elucidate not only their differences but 
also their commonality that provided a key foundation for the neoclassical theory of 
labour.
Walras incorporates his theory of labour exchange into his general equilibrium 
system in Éléments d’économie politique pure (hereafter EEPP).（18）   A feature there 
is that he clearly distinguishes between personal faculties (facultés personnelles) and 
labour (travail) as their service (see Walras 1988, 264–265). This perception is 
comparable with Marx’s labour power–labour distinction, and here Walras is more 
Carl Menger on Labour
135
articulate than Menger and Jevons. 
In Part IV of EEPP, Walras adds markets for ‘productive services (services 
producteurs)’ from land, personal faculties, and capital goods to those for 
consumption goods explicated in the previous part and presents simultaneous 
equations to satisfy the equilibrium of all service and product markets. In this model, 
Walras assumes that personal faculties can be classified just like land and capital 
goods. Without giving an account of this, he quantifies each kind of labour and 
embodies its quantity in production functions with fixed input coefficients in EEPP. 
He also explains that the price of each of the personal faculties can be estimated by 
discounting on the price of the corresponding labour (see Walras 1988, 301–305, 
352–353).
Walras states that the amount of labour can be measured in terms of labour time 
per capita (see Walras 1988, 301). This implies that each time-unit use of a personal 
faculty provides the same service. Hence, variability in the type and intensity of 
labour is precluded.
Furthermore, as Pagano (1985, 100–101) points out, of labour retained or 
purchased for their own consumption and that sold to others, it is solely the former 
that Walras presumes will immediately affect individuals’ welfare. This can be seen 
from the system of equations of equi-marginal utility (‘rareté’ in Walras’s 
terminology) –price ratio for all products and services that Walras presents as being 
required to reach each individual’s maximum satisfaction. Here, Walras includes the 
amount of labour retained or purchased for each individual’s own consumption in 
the argument of her/his utility function, but not that sold to others (see Walras 1988, 
302–303).
（18 ）　For details on Walras’s thought on labour, see Motohiro Okada (2011, 48–52).
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Accordingly, the worker’s welfare and, therefore, her/his labour supply are 
assumed in Walras’s theory to be affected by wages and labour for personal 
consumption or leisure, not by the substance of her/his labour in employment. Thus, 
despite Walras’s perspicuous distinction between personal faculty and labour, the 
worker’s preference as to the type and intensity of her/his labour is naturally left out 
of Walras’s consideration (see Pagano 1985, 111–115).
Unlike Walras, Menger makes little reference to leisure as an opportunity cost 
of work. Instead, as mentioned in Section III, Menger recognises the effect of 
unpleasantness of work on labour supply in some occupations. Yet, Menger denies 
its generality by thinking that work, rather, gives pleasure and satisfaction to most 
people. 
In contrast, Jevons’s theory of labour is based on the notion of work as pain.（19）
In the first edition of The Theory of Political Economy (hereafter TPE) of 1871, he 
defines: ‘Labour is the painful exertion which we undergo to ward off pains of 
greater amount, or to procure pleasures which leave a balance in our favour’ (see 
Jevons 1871, 162, 164). Jevons notes that labour can be attended by pleasure or 
positive utility.（20）    However, he thinks that this case is limited, and labour is 
generally and practically assumed to be an activity involving pain or disutility (see 
Jevons 1871, 166). Consequently, Jevons argues that ‘we must . . . measure labour 
by the amount of pain which attaches to it’ (see Jevons 1871, 164). 
In this manner, Jevons’s subjectivist viewing of economics as ‘a Calculus of 
Pleasure and Pain’ even penetrates his quantitative notion of labour (see Jevons 
1871, vii). In the chapter on labour (Chapter V) in TPE, Jevons presents a modelling 
（19 ）　For details on Jevons’s thought on labour, see Okada (2012).
（20 ）　Jevons assumes that the worker experiences ‘a small excess of pleasure’ during the 
comparatively early stages of continuous labour. Additionally, Jevons observes that work itself is 
interesting and exciting for professionals (see Jevons 1871, 168–169, 176–177). 
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account of the concept of the ‘balance between need and labour’, or the worker’s 
utility maximisation. Here, Jevons offers an explanation to the effect that a man 
works up to the point where the marginal pain accompanying his labour becomes 
equal to the utility that he gains from the marginal product. Jevons assumes that the 
marginal pain of labour first decreases, but thereafter increases persistently with the 
duration of labour time, whereas the marginal utility—or the ‘final degree of utility’ 
in Jevons’s terminology—of the product decreases monotonically (see Jevons 1871, 
165–174; 1879, 184–192). 
The gist of the above model, indeed, could be conceived to be equivalent to 
what John Maynard Keynes called the second classical postulate of employment. 
However, Jevons makes no reference to the demand for labour or the employer. The 
equations of labour that he presents in Chapter V of TPE are restricted to those 
regarding the worker’s subjective equilibrium (see Jevons 1871, 179–183; 1879, 
198–205, 209–219). Accordingly, the worker assumed here is fundamentally self-
employed. This is not accidental. Jevons suggests that one can scarcely possess the 
ability to cardinally measure one’s own feelings, and much less, those of others (see 
Jevons 1871, 19–21; 1879, 13–15). Jevons also perceives that because of the 
variability in labour intensity, labour time is not an adequate measure of labour (see 
Jevons 1871, 165; 1879, 184–185: Black 1977, 253). Hence, labour time cannot be 
an appropriate trading unit in the labour market either; for each time-unit of labour, 
as its requisite, must be assumed to provide the same service. As a result, what 
remains as a candidate for the trading unit in accordance with Jevons’s thinking is 
the pain accompanying labour. However, while a trading unit must be such that both 
the seller and the buyer can perceive it, Jevons’s observations indicate that even the 
worker can hardly gauge her/his own pain and that such measurement completely 
exceeds the employer’s capability. From these discussions, it can be concluded that 
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there is no appropriate trading unit of a labour service as a sine qua non for the 
proper functioning of the labour market. This peculiarity of labour exchange is not 
found in the exchange of land and capital goods services. The trading unit of the 
latter can be well defined on the basis of the physical attributes of the corresponding 
land or capital goods, because of the fact that each (piece of) land or capital good 
with the same physical attributes provides exactly the same service.
Thus, Jevons’s arguments could lead to the negation of the proper functioning 
of the labour market and, therefore, of the market determination of wages and other 
work conditions. They could also afford a ground for the intervention of class strife 
and other socio-political factors in labour exchange. This is a consequence of 
Jevons’s close adherence to his subjectivist approach and the resulting focus on the 
direct impact of labour on the worker’s welfare (see Pagano 1985, 77–81; Spencer 
71–75). Menger and Walras, who are also subjectivists, are lacking in this feature. 
However, in the preface to the second edition of TPE (1879), Jevons argues that 
wages are determined on the same principles as rents and yields on capital. Here, 
Jevons denies the value causality from labour to product as supposed by mainstream 
classical economists and justifies the reverse, that is, from product to labour, whose 
likeness he sees as implied in the Ricardian theory of rent. Furthermore, Jevons 
maintains that the causal relationship flowing from the value of outputs to that of 
inputs generally holds true, whether the latter are services from labour ability, or 
land, or capital goods. Thus, as Menger had already done definitely in GV1, Jevons 
was also ready to break away from the classical doctrine of distribution characterised 
by the application of different rules to the determination of wages, rent, and profit, 
and to shape a neoclassical one by formulating a uniform theory of their 
determination on the principle of the value causality from products to productive 
services (see Jevons 1879, l– lvi). 
Carl Menger on Labour
139
Moreover, in the preface to the second edition of TPE and Political Economy 
(1878), Jevons indicates that, like rents and yields on capital and prices of goods in 
general, wages are determined in the market through ‘the same laws of supply and 
demand’ (see Jevons 1879 li; 1878, 57). As a consequence, while approving union 
activities for a reduced working day on the grounds that workers are not in a position 
to choose their own labour time individually, Jevons objects to union interferences, 
especially strikes, for a pay rise in The State in Relation to Labour of 1882 (see 
Jevons [1882] 1910, 54–89, 93–112).
These views, sketchy as they were, were to ripen into marginal productivity 
theory, the formation of which got into full swing after Jevons’s death. 
However, the chapter on labour (Chapter V) in the second edition of TPE 
presents few momentous changes in Jevons’s thought compared with the same 
chapter in the first edition. Hence, Jevons’s explanations in the former could also 
lead to the negation of the market determination not only of labour time but of wages 
(see Jevons 1879, 181–227). This is at odds with the drift of the preface. This 
contradiction in the second edition of TPE can be ascribed to the collision between 
the consequence of Jevons’s subjectivist approach to value (the preface) and that to 
labour (Chapter V). Jevons himself was hardly aware of it.
Jevons indeed attaches importance to the variability of labour intensity or pain. 
Yet, it may be fair to say that this conception is grounded on physiological 
knowledge of human exertions, rather than on an understanding of the worker’s 
identity and the constraints imposed upon it by the employer. Jevons emphasises the 
variability in the worker’s marginal pain with the duration of labour time, but he 
does not give due consideration to this variability at the same point of labour time or 
the bodily shift of the marginal pain schedule (see, for example, Jevons 1879, 184–
189, 221–227). If the latter is left unconsidered, the entire service from given work 
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hours, despite hourly differences in pain, may be regarded as fixed. Consequently, 
the exchange of labour services may be interpreted on the same footing as that of 
land and other non-human services, as Jevons argues in the preface to the second 
edition of TPE.
Such antinomy as that in the second edition of TPE is not exposed to the light of 
day in Menger’s and Walras’s theories. This is not because they could escape it, but 
because their subjectivism, unlike Jevons’s, did not thoroughly penetrate their 
thought on labour. It was already seen in Section III that Menger restricted the object 
of his economic study on the worker’s behavior to her/his labour supply in the 
market aimed at maximum wages, that is, maximum enjoyment of consumption, and 
he excluded actual work in production and the worker’s motivation behind it from 
the object. 
In the preface to GV1, Menger remarked that: ‘We want to take exception to the 
opinion of those who deny the regularity of economic phenomena with the hint on 
the freedom of will, for hereby economics as exact science is generally negated’ 
(Verwahren möchten wir uns nur gegen die Meinung Jener, welche die 
Gesetzmässigkeit der volkswirtschaftlichen Erscheinungen mit dem Hinweise auf 
die Willensfreiheit des Menschen läugnen, weil hiedurch die Volkswirthschaftslehre 
als exacte Wissenschaft überhaupt negirt wird) (see Menger [1871] 1968, VIII). 
Indeed, he argued that all principal economic phenomena are independent of human 
will (see Menger [1871] 1968, IX). As already noted in Section II, Menger also 
stated in UMS that the most original factors of economy including human needs are 
ultimately independent of human arbitrariness and given by each situation. He added 
that: ‘[T]he starting point and the goal of all economy (requirement and available 
quantity of goods, on the one hand, and the achievable completeness of filling of 
requirement for goods, on the other) are ultimately given to economic men and 
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strictly determined regarding their nature and measure’ ([D]er Ausgangspunkt und 
der Zielpunkt aller Wirtschaft (Bedarf und verfügbare Güterquantität einerseits und 
die erreichbare Vollständigkeit der Deckung des Güterbedarfs anderseits) sind in 
letzter Linie den wirtschaftenden Menschen gegeben, rücksichtlich ihres Wesens 
und ihres Masses streng determinirt) (see Menger [1883] 1969, 45). Thus, Menger 
advocated the existence of rigorous economic causality that is independent of human 
will and viewed the essence of economic study as an exact science elucidating the 
laws of the causality.
Menger also underscored the independence of requirement and the quantity and 
quality of immediately available goods from will in GV2 (see Menger 1923, 34–36). 
However, he wrote:
The labour performances that individual economic subjects or all people 
command are also ultimately given each time. We can train and therefore modify 
labour powers that we command like other production elements. Yet, for the time 
being and immediately they are qualitatively and quantitatively determined by the 
economic situation of the time like material goods.
Only in one relationship we can observe an arbitrary moment regarding the 
mass of immediately available goods. The essence proper to a good lies not in its 
qualities as such but in its aptness to serve certain purposes of use, and hence 
objectively homogeneous things can appear to us as various kind of goods 
according to various services that we give them: for example, fruits appear as 
food, exhibits, and seeds; sticks as props, weapons, and tools. In consequence, 
things that are immediately available to us are certainly determined by the 
situation of the time in a (physically) strict way, but … goods  that are 
immediately available to us assume a partly arbitrary character—especially, this 
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also holds good for labour performances available to us; they appear to us, in a 
sense, as disjunctively determined sizes as well. 
(Auch die Arbeitsleistungen, über welche die einzelnen wirtschaftenden Subjekte, 
beziehungsweise ganze Völker verfügen, sind in letzter Linie jeweilige gegeben. 
Wir vermögen die Arbeitskräfte, über welche wir verfügen, gleich anderen 
Produktionselementen auszubilden und somit zu modifizieren; zunächst und 
unmittelbar sind dieselben jedoch, gleich den materiellen Gütern, durch die 
jeweilige ökonomische Sachlage qualitativ und quantitativ determiniert.
Nur in einer Beziehung vermögen wir auch rücksichtlich der uns unmittelbar 
verfügbaren Gütermenge ein arbiträres Moment zu beobachten. Das 
eigentümliche Wesen eines Gutes liegt nicht in seinen Eigenschaften an sich, 
sondern in seiner Eignung, bestimmten Gebrauchszwecken zu dienen, und 
objektiv gleichartige Dinge vermögen uns demnach, je nach der verschiedenen 
Bestimmung, die wir denselben geben, als Güter sehr verschiedener Art zu 
erscheinen, z. B. Früchte als Mahrungsmittel, als Schaustücke, als Samen; ein 
Stab als Stütze, als Waffe, als Werkzeug usf. Die uns unmittelbar verfügbaren 
Dinge sind demnach durch die jeweilige Sachlage allerdings (physisch) strenge 
determiniert, die uns unmittelbar verfügbaren Güter weisen dagegen—und es 
gilt dies insbesondere auch von den uns verfügbaren Arbeitsleistungen— ... einen 
zum Teile arbiträren Charakter auf; auch sie stellen sich uns im gewissen Sinne 
als disjunktivdeterminierte Größen dar.) (Emphasis in original; Menger 
1923, 36) 
In this way, Menger came to recognise a ‘partly arbitrary’ aspect of requirement 
called ‘disjunctive determination (disjunktive Determination)’ from the likelihood 
that ‘various combination of goods appear as requirement alike and we can 
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choose among them in concrete cases (verschiedene Kombination von Gütern 
sich uns in gleicher Weise als Bedarf darstellen und wir im konkreten Falle zwischen 
denselben zu wählen vermögen)’, and the resulting applicability of the same labour 
ability to a variety of uses as well (emphasis in original; see Menger 1923, 35). （21）
However, there is a vital difference between the use of labour ability and that of 
non-human factors like land and capital goods in the above respect. The service—
more precisely, the range of services—from each of the latter factors is given, 
independently of human will and according to its physical attributes, no matter how 
it is used. Because of this unique factor–service correspondence, the versatility of 
non-human factors is compatible with general equilibrium theory assuming given 
preferences and resources, that is, no room for the play of free will and deriving 
from there the market determination of prices of all services and their actual volume 
of trade. Due to the inalienability of labour ability from its possessor, on the other 
hand, the versatility of labour ability entails the variability of the type and intensity 
of its service as such, contingent on the worker’s preference and the employer’s 
efforts at extracting the service to her/his advantage. Consequently, the substance of 
labour actually performed, whether it is accompanied by pain as Jevons underlines 
or by pleasure as does Menger, and the wage level are generally unable to be 
determined in the market, due to the inadequacy of labour time as a unit of labour 
and the impracticability of positing labour service itself as a trading unit, as Jevons’s 
arguments suggest. Thus, the work conditions are contingent on industrial relations 
in the production process, and therefore the worker–employer power struggle, which 
will not remain individual but develop into labour–capital class strife, and other 
socio-political factors may inevitably enter into the prime determinants of them. This 
（21 ）　For the transition from Menger’s ‘monistic determinism’ in GV1 to his perception of 
‘disjunctive determination’ in GV2, see Yagi (2010, 24–28).
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is irreconcilable with Menger’s standpoint negating the employer–worker and 
capital–labour conflict of interest. 
For all his mention of ‘disjunctive determination’, along with his labour ability–
labour demarcation and care given to actuality, as observed in Section II, Menger 
ignored considerations of the above distinctiveness of labour exchange rooted in the 
variability of labour that depends on the worker’s identity and the constraints 
imposed upon it by the employer, that is, their ‘free will’. This may be a necessary 
result of Menger’s adherence to economics as an ‘exact’ science, whose legitimacy 
is seriously challenged by the distinctiveness.
Walras has a similar view to Menger’s. Walras regards ‘pure economics’ 
dealing with the determination of exchange value as a natural science (see, for 
example, Walras [1860] 2001, 151–153; 1988, 50–51, 52–54; 1993, 487–488). In 
L’économie politique et la justice, he argues: ‘Natural facts will be ... distinguished 
from moral facts in that the former will have their origin in the fatality of natural 
forces, and the latter in human free will’ (Les faits naturels se distingueront ... des 
faits moraux en ce que les premiers auront leur origine dans la fatalité des forces 
naturelles, les seconds dans la volonté libre de l’homme) (see Walras [1860] 2001, 
152). In Walras’s notion, labour exchange is also subject to ‘the fatality of natural 
forces’. Hence, he denies the role of class strife and other ‘moral facts’—or ‘those 
which result from human will being exercised on the will of other humans; in other 
words, the relations of people to people (ceux qui résultent de la volonté de l’homme 
s’exerçant à l’endroit de la volonté des autres hommes, autrement dit les rapports de 
personnes à personnes)’—as determining factors of work conditions (see Walras 
[1860] 2001, 185–186, 522; 1993, 487; 1996, 582–587). He is thus opposed to 
workers’ industrial actions and insists that the state should rationally intervene to 
suppress strikes for the purpose of the better working of product and service markets 
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(see Walras [1898] 1992, 251–253; 1987b, 510).
In The State in Relation to Labour, Jevons also mentions that ‘[A] trade dispute, 
especially when it has reached the acute phase of a strike, has little or nothing to do 
with economics’ (see Jevons [1882] 1910, 159). This may imply that, in Jevons’s 
conception, labour exchange as an object of economic science is limited to the 
worker–employer interplay in the market place and the determination of work 
conditions through it, and the operation of class strife and other socio-political 
factors is excluded from that scope. Jevons’s dichotomy of ‘economic’ and ‘social’ 
matters here lends support to the fact that, while bringing forward discussions that 
could lead to the negation of the market determination of work conditions including 
wages, he did not follow up this enquiry and, instead, clung to his advocacy of the 
market determination of wages. For Jevons too, indeed, the ideal of economics was 
an ‘exact’ mathematical science (see, for example, Jevons 1871, vii–viii; 1879, xvii–
xviii, xxii, 3–5).
Because of these affinities between Menger, Jevons, and Walras, their theories 
had a common limit despite their variances; namely, notwithstanding their focus on 
the economic agent’s motivation with their criticism of classical economists’ lack of 
the perspective, they were deficient in focusing attention on the worker’s idenity as 
to her/his labour performance and the distinctiveness of labour exchange that this 
leads to. This limitation in the triumvirate of the Marginalist Revolution was passed 
down to their successors without being exposed to serious doubts, and it took root in 
the development of neoclassical economics. In the formative process of marginal 
productivity theory, neoclassical economists subsumed labour exchange under their 
general market doctrine, thus leaving the particular characteristics of the exchange 
out of account. Hence, it may well be said that, although the triumvirate’s 
contribution to marginal productivity theory was relatively minor, their thought 
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afforded a pivotal foundation for the neoclassical theory of labour.（22）
VI　Concluding Remarks
This article conducted enquiries into Menger’s thought on labour from various 
angles.
Although Menger did not develop a systematic theory of the price determination 
of productive services, he regarded labour exchange as having the same nature as the 
exchange of non-human services, and hence he argued that wages are determined on 
the same principles as rent and capital interest. Here, he emphasised the value 
causality running from products to productive services as a general rule based on his 
subjectivist approach and criticism of classical notions.
On the other hand, Menger hated to be dubbed a ‘Manchesterite’ and supported 
certain state interventions in the protection of workers. Yet, the drift in his argument 
there was rather modest, and was almost at the same level as that of classical 
economists. Additionally, Menger accentuated the importance of self-help efforts 
and affirmed the labour–capital and labour–management harmony of interest by 
underscoring the indispensability of capital accumulation and entrepreneurship to the 
（22 ）　In Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie of 1887, Menger wrote: ‘There will ... come the time 
when the very devoted efforts by cultivators of exact economics—Boehm, Walras, Wieser, 
Pierson, Marshall, Sidgwick, and Gossen, Jevons, and others—win honours and gain the attention 
that deserves very earnest enquiries aimed at the reform of pure theory’ ([W]ird ... die Zeit 
kommen, wo die so hingebungsvollen Bestrebungen der Bearbeiter  der exacten 
Nationalökonomie: eines Boehm, Walras, Wieser, Pierson, Marshall, Sidgwick, eines Gossen, 
Jevons und Anderer zu Ehren kommen und jene Beachtung finden werden, welche so ernsten, auf 
die Reform der reinen Theorie hinzielenden Forschungen gebührt) (see Menger [1887] 1970, 
131). This passage hints that ‘exact economics’ within the Mengarian meaning, de facto, 
corresponds to neoclassical economics, and that Menger entertained comradely feelings towards 
the pioneers of neoclassical economics from different nations.
Carl Menger on Labour
147
worker’s benefit, thus upholding the capitalist order.
Unlike Walras, Menger referred to the direct impact of labour on the worker’s 
welfare and labour supply. However, Menger neglected it and did not closely 
investigate the problem. This contrasts with Jevons’s standpoint, which viewed the 
substance of labour as pain and thereby evolved discussions that could lead to the 
negation of the market determination of work conditions including wages. Despite 
these differences, Menger, Jevons, and Walras alike lacked perception into the 
worker’s identity as to her/his labour performance and the distinctiveness of labour 
exchange that it brings forth. This limitation was passed down to their successors 
and took root as a characteristic of neoclassical economics, in which labour exchange 
was subsumed under its general market theory based on the marginal and 
maximising principles.
Nikolai Bukharin ([1919] 1927) denounced the doctrine of the Austrian school 
as a bourgeois rentier ideology with an over-exaggeration of consumption and a 
belittlement of production. This criticism may hold for not only Böhm-Bawerk, 
whom Bukharin targeted in the main, but also Menger, who limited the object of his 
economic study on the worker’s behaviour to labour supply in the market place 
aimed at maximum wages, namely, maximum enjoyment of consumption, and 
excepted actual labour and industrial relations in the production process from the 
object. However, while Bukharin’s arguments were chiefly grounded on the censure 
of the Austrian subjectivist theory of value in contradistinction to the Marxian labour 
theory of value, this article focused on Menger’s lack of consideration for the 
worker’s idenity, especially regarding her/his preference concerning the type and 
intensity of labour, despite Menger’s advocacy of subjectivism and respect for 
actuality. The latter trait can also be found in Jevons, Walras, and other neoclassical 
economists. Thus, the perspective presented in this article may shed some light on 
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class bias in neoclassical economics by intrinsically elucidating its inconsistencies, 
and it may thereby offer a more compelling counterargument to its theoretical bases.
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